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ber 27, 1941. The court's calendar was congested during the
month of December and the continuance to January 9, 1942,
was not an abuse of discretion (Murphy v. Superior Oourt,
53 Cal.App. 6 [200 P. 483]). Before the end of December
and early in January each defendant sought and obtained an
.order to take depositions out of the state. These facts furnished further justification for the continuance.
Other points are made by the defendants. They relate to
matters of procedure which are not likely to recur on a retrial
and therefore need not be discussed.
The judgments and the order denying the motion for a new
trial are reversed.

,

Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor,
J., and Schauer, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 18172. In Bank.

Aug. 3, 1943.]

E. C. DENIO et aI., Respondents, v. THE CITY OF HUNTINGTON BEACH, Appellant.
[1] Municipal Corporations-Contracts-Continuing Contracts-

Creating Future Liability.-Where a contract made by the
council or other governing body of a municipality appears to
have been fair,just and reasonable at the time of its execution,
and prompted by the necessities of the situation or in its nature advantageous to the municipality at the time it was en,;.
tered into, it is neit.her void nor voidable merely because some
of its executory features may extend beyond the terms of office
":of the members of such body. In the absence of some other
ground of avoidance, such a contract is binding upon the municipality and may not be summarily cancelled by a successor
council.

;

Ii

[IJ Power of board to make contracts extending beyond its own
term, note, 70 A.L.R. 794. See, also, 18 Cal.Jur. 1006; 38 Am.Jur.
174.
MeR. Dig. References: [1] Municipal Corporations, § 329; [2]
Municipal Corporations, § 199; [3] Municipal Corporations, §§ 273,
304&; [4] Municipal Corporations, § 307; [5-7] Municipal Corporations, § 298; [8, 9] Municipal Corporations, § 386; [10, 12] Municipal Corporations, § 381; [11] Appeal and Error, § 1462.
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[2] Id.-Councll-As Continuing Body.-The council ofa munici-

pal corporation is a continuing body and in legal contemplation
remains the same council regardless of changes in its personnel.
[3] ld.-Officers and Employees-Employment of Special Counsel:
Compensation-Effect of Wrongful Discharge.-Acontract of
employment of special counsel to assist the city attorney in
securing returns to the city from oil in the tide and overflow
lands within the city boundaries is valid and binding on the
city, and for breach of that contract by wrongful discharge of
such· counsel, the latter are entitled to recover the comperisation specified by the terms of such contract of employment.
[4] ld. - Officers and Employees -- Compensation-EvidenceAbandonment of Contract.-In an action against a city to recover attorneys' fees under a written contract,afulding that
plaintiffs did not abandon the cot·tract was supported .by testimony that they never refused to do anything reqnested of
them, but offered to aid in pending negotiations if they. could,
and that they, continued research for the city u:t' to the time
of the attempt to t~rminate their employment.
[6] Id.--Officers and Employees-Compensation-Percentage on
Oll Royalties Derived from City property.-In', an action
against a city to recover attorneys' fees under a contract .which
gave plaintiffs the right to receive percentages: 'on royalties
received by the. city from oil produced on eitt' property, the.
oil produced by an oil company waS shown to. havetbeen drawn
from tide and overflow· lands within the .cityb()Uildaries, where
a lease to such company described the lands from .which oil was
proposed to be extracted as lying between,the .lin~.(,f mean
high tide and a boundary of the city, and where aiimbsequent
compromise agreement, under which the city recei'Vedi the: royalties involved, referred to an "Agreement .for Easement" and
recited that the lands therein described as "lying. along andse~
ward from the line of mean high tide" were.ge~erl!.1Jy,coe:x:ten"\
si ve with the lands described in the . lease•. ",.
,. ,';,p'......'.....
.' . I
..
'.: .,. . "
~

[6] ld.-Omcers or Employees-Compensation-"':Construction of

Oontract;-Any ambiguity in a contract between'specialcounsel and a city for attorneys' fees must. be construed against,
counsel who prepared the contract. .
'.
. .'
. .'
[7] ld.-Officers and Employees-Oompensation-Percentage on
Royalties Derived from Oity Property.-Under acontraetgi.mg special counsel fora city the right to receive percentages
. ':::::

[3] Power of municipal corporation to employ attorney, note, 83
A.L.R. 135. See, also, 18 Cal.Jur. 966; 37 Am.Jur. 738.< :
.
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on royalties received by the city from oil produced on city
property,the word "royalties" should not be construed in the
narrow and limited sense as meaning a share of the oil taken
from lands within the city buundaries, where it was apparent
from other provisions of the contract that the parties did not
intend that the payments to counsel must be made out of the
same coins or currency which the city might receive,· but that
. they .understood the word "royalties" to include money which
thc city might recover by way of compromise or settlement of
its claim to the oil in certain tide lands.
[8] Id. - Property - Tidelands - Actions - Questions of Fact.With regard to a city's rights in tidelands within the city
boundaries, it was a question of fact under the evidence
whether the facts surrounding the execution of an agreement
between the city and an oil company showed that the company had bought the oil under the tidelands from the state
and that what it was buying from the city was a right to drill
from the uplands into that oil.
[9] Id.-Property-Tidclands-Actions-Evidence.-With regard
to a city's claim to the oil and royalties from tidelands within
the city boundaries, the evidence supported an implied finding
that all of the money paid by an oil company to the city was
by way of compromise of such claim, where the contract under
which the payments were made was a compromise agreement
and purported to be based on the city's claim to the oil.
[10] Id. - Property - Tidelands-Oil Royalties.-Where an oil
company in full settlement and satisfaction of a city's claims
for oil and gas royalties from oil produced under tidelands
within the city boundaries agreed to pay the city a certain
sum and thereafter a percentage of the gross amount from
sale of oil and gas produced, the fact that the initial s:um was
paid in one payment did not preclude a finding that it was
paid as royalty.
[11] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Error Favorable to
Appellant.-The fact that the verdict rendered awards plaintifis less than they might be entitled to recover does not prejudice the defendant.
[12] Municipal Corporations-Property-Tidelands-Oil Royalties-Compromise of Claims.-Where an 6il company entered
into an agreement with a city in order to settle and compromise the city's claims for oil and gas royalties out of tidelands
within the city boundaries, it was within the city's power,
when that contract was made, to specify therein exactly what
amount was to be paid in compromise of the royalty claims
and what amouilts were to be paid for other considerations,
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and if the city deliberately caused or negligently permitted
such contract to be so phrased as to' confuse the amount to be
paid it for compromise of royalty claims with other amounts;
the city, unless it is chargeable on the full amount received,
should bear the burden of proving segregation.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior: Court of
Orange County. George K. Scovel, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for attorneys' fees under a written contract. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed.
Drumm, Tucker & Drumm and Ray H. Overacker, City Attorney, for Appellant.
Forgy, Reinhaus & Forgy for Respondents.'
SCHAUER, J.-Defendant city of Huntington Beach appeals from a judgment,based on a jury verdict, awarding to
plaintiffs $2,000 as attorneys' fees for services rendered to
defendant under a written contract between the parties. After
plaintiffs had partially performed the services called for by
the co:ntract, defendant city discharged them. The city now
seeks to' justify such discharge on the ground that the contract
was ultra vires and void in its inception, and on the further
ground that plaintiffs had abandoned the contract prior to
such discharge. The city also asserts that plaintiffs have not
shown that it has received the particular fund, or the precise
amount thereof, from which plaintiffs were to be paid. We
have concluded, however, that upon the record nOile of defen.
dant's'propositions is tenable and that the judgment must be
affirmed.
The terms of the contract, set forth in a letter from plain.
tiffs to defendant, are in material part as follows:
"The firm of Denio, Hart, Taubman & Simpson will act
as special counsel for the City of Huntington Beach in ·cooper.
ation with your City Attorney in:
"(a) The preparation of a freeholders' charter for submission to the electors of the City of Huntington Beach for
adoption or rejection 8.<; soon as reasonable possible.
"(b) In all suits and legal matters in connection with your
proposed efforts to obtain the City's just control and returns
from the oil, gas or other hydrocarbon substances cZaimed by

584
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it or to which it is entitled, in the tide or overflow lanns
within the City boundaries of the City of Huntington Beach.
"For the above services we are to receive the following
compensation:
'
"1. A retainer of Twenty-five Hundred Dollars ($2500.00)
in cash upon the execution hereof, which shall be, in case no
recovery is had as hereinafter specified, in full for all legal
services rendered or to be rendered in the above, exclusive of
court costs, filing fees, printing, traveling and hotel expenses.
"2. If a recovery is had by the City of Huntington Beach,
either by a Court decision or by a compromise or settlement
of the City's claims, we are further to be paid out of all
moneys paid to the City of Huntington Beach as royalties, or
received by it out of the sale of its oil, gas or other hydrocarbon substances, if its royalties are paid to it in kind, the
following:
"Ten Per Cent (10%) of the moneys so received by the
City for the first two (2) years j
"Fifteen Per Cent (15%) of the moneys so received by the
City for the next three (3) years j
"Twenty Per Cent (20%) of the moneys so received by
the City for the next ten (10) years.
"The above payments to commence with the first .returns
paid to or received by the City of Huntington Beach on
account of royalties, as above.
"In computing the above periods of percentage payinents,
the time during which the City does not receive royalty payments, directly or indirectly, either in money or in kind, shall
be excluded.
"Payments to be made to this firm within ten (10) days
after receipt by the City of its royalties.
"It is understood, of course, that your City Attorney will
be in charge of all litigation, and that all compromises, if any,
will be subject to his approval and to the approval of your
Honorable body." (Italics added.)
The contract was executed on behalf of the city by its mayor
and city clerk, by direction of its council, stated in its Resolution No. 769, adopted March 1, 1937,the $2500 retainer fee
was paid to plaintiffs, and they entered upon the performance
of their obligations under the contract.
The parties continued under their contractual relationship
until August 29, 1938, when the defendant's city council
adopted its Resolution No. 814, as follows:
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"That that certain Resolution No. 769 entitled: 'Resolution of the City Council of the City of Huntingtoh Beach,
California, Employing Special Counsel', be and .thesaine is
repealed and the contract therein referred to is hereby cancelled and the said attorneys are hereby discharged."
By a letter to plaintiffs dated October 6, 1938,' the city
attorney of Huntington Beach notified plaintiffs of tne adoption of the above resolution. Plaintiffs replied as fonows, by
a letter dated October 8, 1938:
"This day we received a letter from your City Attorney
referring to the action taken August 29, 1938 by the City
Council of t1;te City of Long Beach by Resolution No. 814.
"This is to inform you that we remain, as at all times we
have been, ready, able, and willing to proceed and perform '
all services under our contract of employment with the City
of Huntington Beach, as special counsel for said city for the
purposes, and upon the conditions and compensation set forth
in our said contract of employment. We do not concede your
right to terminate our right to the compensation set forth in
said contract, and we do not consent to any purported termination of the contract or our rights thereunder. We will
continue to hold ourselves ready to act as special counsel for
the City of Huntington Beach in cooperation with your City'
Attorney in all suits and le~al matters in connection with the
matters and things referred to in said contract or relating
thereto, and will expect to receive the compensation therein
provided. " (Italics added.)
At the time of the execution of the contract here involved
(March 1, 1937), Huntington Beach was a city' of the sixth
class j shortly thereafter its citiZens adopted a ,charter which,
became operative on May 15, 1937 (State. 1937,·P:!2975)'." trh~:'
city's uplands lie northeasterly of, and adjacent :t'O;' 't1l~ ,'llif~' ,
of mean high tide of the Pacific Ocean. Its solitlrWest hoUri)
dary parallels that line and is ,distant threem,ile~',' (~iut i ih.'tJ;iifi
ocean) from it (corresponding with thesouthwestbourl:dlri-Y"
line of the State of California). (Carrv.'Kin{/sburY;'(f9:n')1'
111 Cal.App. 165 [295 P. 586].) The charter declares' 'that':
the boundaries shall continue to be the same ·as'before'tli~r.
charter was adopted. (Art. II, Charter; Stats. 1937;pp. 2975,
2977.) A contr.oversy had arisen between the city and, the :
State of California as to their respective rights to extract oil'
from the so-called "tide and overflow lands" withiri tne citY~·
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boundaries, and over royalties from wells which might be
whipstocked into such lands from surface locations on the
uplands bordering the ocean. (See Carr v. Kingsbury, supra;
Joyner v. Kingsbury (1929), 97 Cal.App. 17 [275 P. 255].)
Defendant city, as one of the claimants to the oil, in 1934
had entered into an oil lease with the Southwest Exploration
Company, whereby it was attempted to give that company
the right to drill for and remOve oil from the tide and overflow lands mentioned hereinabove. Such lease reserved a one~
sixth royalty to thc city. The area described in the lease is
bounded on the northeast by the linc of mean high tide, on
thc northwest by the northwest boundary of the city which
extends three miles into or over the occan, on the southwest
by thc southwest boundary of the city (which parallels the
shore line, three miles out in the ocean), and on the southeast
by, the southelUlt line of Twenty-third Street extended Over the
ocean. However, apparently because the company doubted the
city's right to the oil under this area, no development work
was done under that lease.
Ocean Avenue is a public street of the city of Huntington
Beach, 100 feet wide, and parallels the shore line a few hundred feet distant from it. 'The city claims that it owns this
street in fee (see Marshall v. Standard Oil Co. (1936), 17
Cal.App~2d 19 [61 P.2d 520]), and that it therefore has the
right to prevent the whipstocking of oil wells from the landward side of the street, under its surface and thus into the
oil sands underlying the tidelands.
By a document entitled "Agreement for Easement No.
392," dated September 26, 1938, the State of California purported to grant to the Southwest Exploration Company the
right to drill into the tidelands area hereinabove described,
from surface locations on uplands in the city of Huntington
Beach lying northeasterly of the described area; i.e., northeasterly of the mean high tide line.
Under date of November 3, 1938, the city of Huntington
Beach and the Southwest Exploration Company entered into
a contract entitled "Agrcement and Easement for Right of
,
Ways. " This contract reads, in part, as follows:
"WHEREAS, . . . under date of thc 26th day ofSt>ptember, 1938, the State of California ... did by .. 'A~reemt'nt.
for Easement No. 302 .
grant to Southwest an casement
throllg-h, in and under certain lands " . together with the
right to • • . take . • . oil, gas, and other hydrocarbon sub0

0

.'
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stances through oil wells to hc drilled . . : from the uplands,'
and
"WITEREAS, SOlithwest is now drilling certain oil wells
into the lands described in said Agreement', '. . ;, and
"WITEREAS, ITuntington Beaeh has claimed and now
claims to be entitled to the payment of certainmoniE\S from'
Southwest and to certain royalties by reason of an;y opcrntil1n~
of Southwest under ... said Agreement for ~'Easemen(No.
392 . . . , :which said claim is disputed and denied by; South";
west, and,
1:,.'JL
:.~
"WHEREAS,
under date of the 4th day of Octobet?1934, the parties hereto did enter into a certain agreement' in:
writing entitled 'Oil and Gas Lease' . ; 0' the laitds:describcd
in said Oil and Gas Lease hl::ing generally coe,:densiveWitk,
the lands described in said above mentionea;Agreement,':j.or"
Easement No. 392, and Southwest has questioned, and; now
questions the right, power and authoritY-of Huntington Beach
'
to enter into said Oil and Gas Lease, a n d ,
"WHEREAS, the parties hereto have never operated under,
said Oil ,and Gas Lease, and do not, now contemplate operations thereunder, except as hereinafter provided, '
' '
"NOW THEREFORE, in order to settle and compromise,
the claims of Huntington Beach to the payrrtento/ monies and
royalties to it by Southwest, and in full settlement and satisfaction thereof, it is understood and agreed as follows:,
"1. ' Upon the due execution and delivery of' this agreement, Southwest agrees to and has here'with paid to Huntington Beach the sum of Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($25;~
000.00) lawful money of the United States, receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged.
"2. Southwest further agrees to pay to Huntington Beach
monthly a sum equal to two per cent (2%) of one hundred
per cent (100%) of the gross amount received by Southwest
from the sale of one hundred percent (100%) of all the oil,
gas and other hydrocarbons produced, saved and sold by
Southwest during the preccdin~ calendar month from the
lands described in the above mentioned Agreement, said pay.
ments to be made on the 20th day of each month until; in
addition to the monies provided for in paragraph 1 hereof,
there has been paid to Huntington Beach the further sum of
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00).
"3. After Southwest shall have paid to Huntington BeacA
<

0

••

,':;;.
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the total sum of One Hundred Seventy-five Thousand ($175,000.00) Dollars, in the manner and at the times provide~ in
paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof, Southwest shall pay to Huntmgton Beach monthly a sum equal to two per cent (2%) of
the total royalties paid to the State of California by S.outhwest pursuant to the provisions of the above mentIOned
Agreement for Easement No. 392 ...
"4. .., Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained, it is expressly understood and agreed that payments of monies provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3 hereof
shall apply only to wells, the producing intervals of which
are located in whole or in part in lands within the confines of
the city limits of Huntington Beach, extended vertically
downward, regardless of the location of the derrick or other
surface structures.
. "5. In so far as Huntington Beach has any interest in or
to that certain . . . parcel of land . . . which lands are generally known as Ocean Avenue ... , Huntington Beac.hdoes
hereby grant to Southwest any and all easements and rIght of
ways into under and through said lands necessary or condeemed by Southwest to be necessary or convenient
venient
to its operations under the provisions of the above mentioned
Agreement for Easement No. 392.
"6. It is specifically understood and agreed that the payment of monies made by Southwest to Huntington Beach
'pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 hereunder shall not b.e
considered or regarded as being made pursuant to any oblIgations imposed upon Southwest by the provisio?,s, terms,
covenants and conditions of the above mentIOned 011 and Gas
Lease dated the 4th day of October, 1934 between the parties
hereto, or any other agreements heretofore made with said
City, ...
"7. In the event that either by the final decision of a
court of competent jurisdiction or by the terms of a compromise agreement it shall be determined that Huntington Beach
is the owner of the oil, gas and other hydrocarbon substan.ces
within and underlying the tide and submerged lands lymg
within the city limits of the City of H\lntington Beach, in.
cluding the above mentioned lands, then the Oil and .Gas
Lease dated October 4, 1934,shallbecome effective and the
parties hereto shall thereafter operate thereunder and in accordance with the provisions thereof, and Southwest shall

0;

·.r ,
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pay to Huntington Beach the royalties therem contained,
provided further that any monies paid to Huntington Beach
by Southwest hereunder shall be applied in partial or total
payment and satisfaction of the monies provided for in paragraph 11 of said Oil and Gas Lease. . . . " (Italics added.)
Upon the execution of the above agreement of November
3, 1938, Southwest Exploration Company paid to defendant
city the sum of $25.,000. Production was obtained from wells
drilled under such agreement and prior to the commencement
of this action defendant had received from the company the
additional sum of $2,794.09, representing the two per cent
payment provided for in paragraph numbered 2 of the agreement. Plaintiffs claim in this action that under the terms of
their contract of employment with th~ city they ,are entitled
to ten per cent of all the moneys received by the. city under
its contract with the Southwest Exploration Company. Defendants, however, contend:
1. That the contract between plaintiffs and defendant
city is "ultra vires, is contrary to publicpolicy, and is void."
2. That the evidence shows that plaintiffs abandoned the
contract, and that therefore "the city was within its legal
rights in cancelling said contract."
3. That there is no evidence showing that any of the oii
produced by Southwest Exploration Company came from be7
neath the tide and overflow lands within the boundaries of
the city of Huntington Beach, as contemplated by paragraph
(b) of the contract between plaintiffs and defendant city.' '
4. That plaintiffs failed to show what portion, if any, of
the money received by the city from Southwest Exploration
Company constituted royalties as distinguished from .pay~
ments for "easements and matters· compromised. "
5. That in any event the initial $25,000 payment to the
city constituted a bonus rather than a royalty, and therefore
plaintiffs are not entitled to .a share thereof.
In support of its first contention defendant argues that the
contract between plaintiffs and defendant "extends beyond
the term of office of the members of the City Council which
created it and attempts to bind their successorS," .and that
therefore such contract cannot be upheld. The right of ~a
municipality to employ special counsel is conceded~
..., ,
Th'e terms of the contract, above quoted, do not. themselves
.i.

f,')!.
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directly specify the period of time over which plaintiffs were
to render services to defendant. However, Mr. Denio, one of
the plaintiil's, testified that it was "understood" that plaintiffs would "attend to all . . . matters, under the City Attorney, of course" which might arise "during the time of
. . . employment," including "Anything arising protecting
Huntington Beach and its oil rights, what they conceived to
be their rights." He further testified that during the fifteenyear period designated in paragraph numbered 2 of the employment COlltract plaintiil's were "whenever called upon,"
to protect whatever rights the city had, "Or assist in protectin~ them because we were uuder orders always of the
City Attorney." It thus appears that the plaintiil's' services
were to be available to defendant city for the full term durin~ which they were to receive compensation.
. [1] It is our opinion, however, that the law is settled in
California that a contract made by the council or other governing body of a municipality, which contract appears to
have been fair, just, and reasonable at the time of its execution, and prompted by the necessities of the situation or in
its nature advantageous to the municipality at the time it
was entered into, is ncither void nor voidable merely because
some of its executory features may extend beyond the terms
of office of the members of such body. In the absence of some
other ground of avoidance, such a contract is binding upon
the municipality and may not be summarily canceled by a
successor council. See McBean v. City of Fresno (1896), 112
Cal. 159, 169 [44 P. 358, 53 Am.St.Rep. 191,31 L.R.A. 794] ;
Higgins v. San Diego Water Co. (1897), 118 Cal. 524, 554
[45 P. 824, 50 P. 670J; Marin Water etc. Co. v. Town of Sausalito (1914), 168 Cal. 587 I143 P. 767] ; Williams v. City of
Stockton (1925), 195 Cal. 743 [235 P. 986] ; Cope v. County
of Sutter (1929),206 Cal. 445, 454 [274 P. 750] ; Skidmore v.
County of A.lameda (1939),13 Cal.2d 534,537 [90 P.2d 577] ;
San Francisco v. Boyd (1941),17 Cal.2d 606 [110 P.2d 103G] ;
Pacific Finance Corp. v. City of Lynwood (1941), 11-1 Cal.
App. 5W [300 P. 50, 1 P.2d 520] ; [(ing City Union H. S.
Dist. v. Waibel (1934), 2 Cal.App.2d 65 [37 P.2d 8GI]·
Skidmore v. Dambacher (1935),6 Cal.A.pp.2d 83,87 [43 P.2d
1110]. [2] The council of a municipal corporation is a contillUin/: body and in ICg'al contemplation remains thc Imme council
regardless of changes in its personnel (see Cope v. County of
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Sutter, supra; King C£ty Union H. S. Dist. v. ~aibel, supra, at
p. 68) . .As was stated by the District Court of Ap~eal in Pacific
Finance Corp. v. City of Lynwood, s'upra (at pp. 518-519 of
114 Cal.App.) : " . . . we know of no reason whY.11 city; as
wcll as an individual, should not be expected to keep faith with
those with whom it contracts, or else respond in damages for
its failure." [3] We conclude that the contract of employ-ment here involved is valid, and hinding npOll, defendant
city, and that for the breach of that contract by defendant,
i.e., the discharge of plaintiffs if such discharge was wrongful, plaintiffs are, undcr the longo-established rule'in Califor~
nia, entitled to recover the compensation specified by the
terms of such contract of employment. (See BhZdwiwV':Ben-'
nett (1854), 4 Cal. 392; Cole v. Superior Court"(1883), 63
Cal. 86, 88' [49 Am.Rep. 78]; Webb v.Tre'scony '(1888),
76 Cal. 621, 623 [18 P. 796] ; Bartlett v. Odd Fellows Savings:
Bank (1889), 79 Cal. 218, 222 [21 P. 743, 12 Am.St.Re'p.
139]; Carter v. Baldwin (1892), 95 Cal. 475 [30 P: 505];
Kirk v. Culley (1927), 202 Cal. 501, 506 [261 P; 994] ;·.El.
conin v. Yalcn (1929),208 Cal. 546, 549 [282 P. 791] ;Zurick
G. A. &7 L. Ins. 00., Ltd. v. Kinsler (1938), 12 Ca1.2d 9R,
100-101 [81 P.2d 913] ; Echlinv. Superior Court (1939), 13
Ca1.2d 368,375 [!JO P.2d 63, 124 A.L.R. 719] j Oountryman v.
California Trona Co. (1917),35 Cal.App. 728, 736,[170 P.
1069] j McCully v. Gano (1931), 116 Cal.App. 695, 698-699 .
[3 P.2d 348] j Green v. Skerritt (1936), 17 CaLAppi2d732,
736-737 [62 P.2d 769].)
[4] Defendant contends, however, in effect (as its second
ground for rcversal), that the evidence, requirQs: a ,finding
tha~ plaintiff~ had aban~on~d th? contract and. he~ce that i~
actIOn declarmg the piamtiffs dIscharged and 'theIr contract
canceled was proper. A survey of the record discloses'thlit
defendant's position on this point is not tenable:
It is undisputed that plaintiffs performed a large volume
of work for defendant after the execution of the contract of
employment. They draft.ed the charter which was adopted,
conferred numerous times with officers of the city, carriedollt
extensive log-al research on the problems prescnted, and prepared a :mg-gested new zoning ordinance for the eity with It
view to preventinf! the drilling of oil wells on certain uplands
that would tap the oil sands under the ocean. Certain mem-
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bers of plaintiffs' firm made, two trips to the State Capitol
during a legislative session to attempt to secure legislationgiving defendant city title to the oil in controversy. It appears that the bulk of these JOervices was performed' during
1937, and that plaintiffs' activity lessened somewhat during
the first half of 1938. Mr. Simpson; one of plaintiffs, testified" however, that he continued research for defendant city
"to a more or less extent right up to the time when they [the
city] attempted to terminate our employment." He also testified as follows concerning a conversation he had with the City
Attorney of Huntington Beach in January, 1938: "We discussed generally the fact of the pending-of the condition of
the legislation then pending concerning the Huntington Beach
oil. In other words, we talked back and forth to the effect
that the Legislature before its adjournment in 1937 had
passed several bills affecting the Huntington Beach tideland
oil matters. Two of these had been signed by the Governor.
Both of those bills that had been signed by the Governor had
been held up by referendum, and as I recall, I think there
was also litigation filed trying to invalidate the referendum
on the two. . . .
". . . we discussed the fact that everything was held in
abeyance at this time because no one knew what the law
would be, the statute would be that might be passed concerning the Huntington Beach tidelands proposition as a matter
of legislation.
"Yes, I told [the city attorney] . . . that we should not
do anything on any of the other propositions we had pending,
other programs, except we should go ahead with our zoning
set-up. I told him that I had checked over as carefully as I
could all of the zoning ordinances, restrictive ordinances of
the City of Huntington Beach. . . . and I had done considerable research into the legal angles involved and that I had
come to the conclusion that their zoning ordinances were invalid and void."
Mr. Taubman, another of plaintiffs, gave the following testimony concerning a conversation he had with the Mayor of
Huntington Beach in the late summer or early fall of 1938:
"I don't know how the subject matter came up. The substance of it was that [the mayor] . . . told me-I rather
imagine I made inquiry of him as to the status, and he stated
that the Southwest Exploration Company, he thought, was
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in a position to negotiate concerning the matte~ of theOity'
securing some of the proceeds from the oil production" that
the time had arrived when they were ripe, so' to speak,. for
such negotiations. . . .
' .
"Q. I will ask you, Mr. Taubman, whether or not you ever
refused to furnish any advice or to do anything w~ich waIJ
requested of you by the City of Huntington Beach, or any of
its officers, in connection with procuring returns from, oil on
behalf of the City? WITNESS: A. I did not. In fact, t think
on one of these occasions, I offered, when [the mayor 1 . ."
told me he was negotiating with these gentlemen, one of wh~m
I told him I had known for many years, I offered to aid if 1
could and discuss the matter with him and he said no, he had
the thing well in hand and he was going to get what the City
was entitled to, either that, or no one else would get it."
(Italics added.)
'l'his testimony of plaintiffs Simpson. and, Taubman was apparently accepted by the jury as true and is sufficient to support plaintiffs' assertion that they did not abandon the contract. A conflict created by certain testimony of the city attorney and mayor simply presented an issue of fact' which the jury
resolved in favor of plaintiffs. Such determination is binding
on us.
[5] Defendant's third contention-'-that the oil produced
by Southwest Exploration Company is not shown to have
been drawn from lands included in plaintiffs' contract; i.e.,
from "the tide· or overflow lands within the City, boundaries"
-is answered by the terms of the pertinent documents an'd
by the inferences reasonably deducible from them and from
the circumstances shown. Such documents are the lease of
October 4, 1934, and the contract of November 3, 1938. between the city of Huntington Beach and the Southwest Exploration Company. The lease described the land from which
oil was proposed to be extracted as lying within the boundaries of the city and between the ~ine of mean high tide and
the southwe'st boundary of the city. The compromise contract
of November 3, under which the city has received the moneys
here involved, referred to the lease and provided for its re·The word "tidelands" is used in the lease' of October 4, 1934, to
denote the area extending from the mean high tide line seaward
for a distance of three miles, to the city's southwest boundary. '
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vivor upon the happening of certain contingencies. The same
contract also referred to the "Agreement for Easement No.
392," bctwcen the State of California and the Southwest Exploration Company, under which the company proposed to
extract oil from certain described lands within the defendant
city lying along and seaward from the line of mean high tide
a?d recited the fact that such lands wcre "gcnerally coexten:
SlV~ with the lands" described in the lease of October 4, 1934.
It IS specifically provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the contract of November 3 that the payments by Southwcst Exploratio.n Company to the city shall be measured by income
from oil taken from beneath the lands described in the
"Agreement for ~asement No. 392." Therefore, it appears
to be amply establIshed that the payments made to the city
by the company were on account of oil produced, or contemplated to be produced, only from the tide or overflow lands
within the city limits hereinabove specified.
Defendant's remaining points-that the evidence fails
to s~ow what portion,.if any, of the money received by
the CIty from the operatmg company constituted royalties as
distinguished from payments for "easements and matters'
compromised," and that in any event the initial $25,000 pay~ent to the city was a .bonus. rather than a royalty-are also
disposed of by a conSIderatIOn of the documents involved
which include the lease of October 4, 1934, the plaintiffs' con~
tract for legal services, and the subsequent contract of No,:ember 3, 1938, between the city and the Southwest ExploratIon Company. Defendant argues that at least a portion of
th.e payments made to the city by the operating company constItuted rentals for the use of the casement under Ocean Avenue rather than royalties on the oil produced.
[6] It is to be n~ted that the contract between plaintiffs
and the defendant CIty was drawn by plaintiffs and hence
any ambiguity therein, the interpretation of which is otherwise uncertain, must be construed against plaintiffs. [7]. But
the same situation does not exist as to the contract of November 3, 1938, insofar as it purports to determine the characterof the. compen~ation paid by the Southwest Exploration
Company to the CIty. The plaintiffs are not parties to that
contract and did not draft it. The question on this point which
was before the trial court and jury for original determi~ation
was as to the meaning which the plaintiffs and defendant
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ascribed to the word "royalties" in their, use of it in the
contract for attorneys' fees. DefendaIlt seeks to have us rule '
that as a matter of law the word must be construed in a narrow and limited sense as meaning a share, or the money equivalent of a share, of the "oil, gas or other hydrocarbon substances taken from the tide or overflow lands" within the
city boundaries. But we find nothing in the contract which
requires us, or which required the trial court or jury, to
limit the word to such a restricted meaning.
The contractual provision for the percentage payment
which is in controversy is conditioned upon this statement:
"If a recovery is had by the City of, Huntington Beach,
either by a Court dccision or by a compromise or settlement
of the City's claims ... " This condition clearly has been
met. The agreement then continues "we are further to be paid
out of all moneys paid to the City of Huntington Beach as
royalties, or received by it out of the sale of its oil, gaS or
other hydrocarbon substances, if its royalties are paid to it
in kind, the following .. ." (italics added) and then sets
forth certain percentages ranging from ten to twenty per
cent over a period of fifteen years. The primary purpose of
thi'3 provision is to specify the fund in relation to which the
amounts to accrue to plaintiffs shall be determined. While the
contractual provision is that plaintiffs are. "to be paid out of
all moneys" so received by the city, it is obvious from other
provisions that the parties do not inteIld to imply that money
shall not be treated in its fungible sense or that tliepayments,
to plaintiffs must be made out of the same coiris or ciIrrencj(
which defendant may reccive. Rather, it· appears' to be the
intention to identify the fund as an· account which.is. to con-,
stitute the basis for determination' of the amotirit ,otiplain-:
tiffs' compensation. Thus it seems to bea fair conchiSiohthaJ
the plaintiffs in writing their letter to the city; Which letter by
acceptance of the city became tliecontract of 'emplo~ent~
used language in its general or loose Remie, rather than. in its'
strictly limited or technical sense, and that suchusage:Vvas
understood by the city. The very fact, self-eVident fro~ th_e
contract, that the parties contemplated that the city '8 re~
covery of royalties might be accomplished by comproinise~f
its claims, suggests that they understood and used that ,word
(royalties) in its general or loose sense and not in its strictly
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limited sense.. Manifestly, money received in compromise of a
claim for royalties would not be directly a "share of the oil"
or its proceeds; yet obviously it was not unreasonable for the
jury to conclude that the parties understood the word "royalties, " as they used it, to include money which the city might
recover by way of compromise or settlement of its claims to the
oil in the so-called tidelands. It is entirely within reason that
the parties may even have contemplated that the city's recovery might consist of a single payment. If one single cash
payment in compromise and full settlement of the city's
claim for royalties had been made, that fact alone would not
support a claim that in the contemplation of plaintiffs' contract no royalty had been received by defendant and therefore no percentage thereof was due plaintiffs.
The words "royalty" and "rent," it has been held, "are
used interchangeably to convey the same meaning"; i.e., "the
compensation which the occupier pays the landlord for that
species of occupation which the contract between them allows"
(Nelson v. Republic Iron &1 Steel 00. (1917),240 F. 285, 291,
293 [153 C.C.A. 211] ; Elsinore Oil 00. v. Signal Oil etc. 00.
(1935), 3 Cal.App.2d 570, 573[40 P.2d 523]). Defendant,
in a statement in its brief hereinafter quoted, seems to imply
that "royalty" is, or includes, the price paid by the operator
to the landowner for the oil. It is obvious, from a consideration of the terms of the documents described above and from
other evidence in the record, that there was a conflict between
the claims of defendant city and those of the State of California as to the ownership of the oil in the described lands.
It is also obvious that the Southwest Exploration Company
was desirous of exploiting those lands for oil and gas production and that it was willing to pay compens.ation to both the
defendant city and to the state for the 1tSe of those lands to
the end stated. It is a fair conclusion that all of the money
it paid to the defendant city was paid for the purpose of
enabling it to so exploit such lands. Apparently it had no
other usage for such lands and contemplated no income from
them except that to be derived from the production of oil, gas,
and other hydrocarbon substances, and had no occasion to seek
any easement over or through any of defendant's property
except for the purpose of using that easement in the extraction of oil from the disputed property.
[8] Continuing on this phase of its attack on the judg-
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ment defendant makes the assertion that "ihecontraet, be7\

twee~ Southwest Exploration Company and .the'·City'shows

on its face that it is for easements and other privileges' 'and'
that Southwest Exploration Company expressly denies that
the City of Huntington Beach has any ri~hts to the oil ~r gas"
under the tidelands. The facts surroundmg t4e e:cecuttcmof
this agreement between the City and Southwes~.' EXploration.
Company show clearly that Southwest E:cploratf,on Oompan'l!
had bought the oil under the tidelands from th~State of ~al'-,
fornia and that what it was buyinglrom the O'£t1!0f H~nttn~:
ton Beach was a right to dM'll t.rom the .upZartds;mto that oil. ,
(Italics added.) The foregoing argumen~ is' orie'Whi~h,proI?~
erly should have been addressed to the JUry. In,dubItablY,It
was not based upon unconflicting evidence. [9l The contt~ct
referred to by defendant, itself tends to refute the conclUSIOn
of fact for which defendant argues. It recites.the fact 88 to
the execution of the lease of 1934 by and between the South~
west Exploration Company and the city, the fact that ,such
company had not operated under that lease, that it had pro-,
cured the agreement of September 26, 1938, from th~ State 0.£
California, that it had proceeded thereunder, to drill for 011
in the same lands as were described in the lease, arid that
"Huntington Beach has claimed and now claims to be entitled
.to the payment of certain monies from Southwest and to certain royalties by reason of any operations of Southwest under
and pursuant to said Agreement for Easement No. 392, and
it is understood that Huntington Beach claims for itself the
oil, gas and other hydrocarbon substances underlying said
lands, which said claim is disputed and denied by Southwest. . .
,
"NOW THEREFORE, in order to settle and compromise
the claims of Huntington Beach to the payment of monies and
royalties to it by Southwest, .•. it is ..• agreed," etc.
"
'
(Italics added.)
Coupled with the above-quoted declaratIon of the claUD.,
of the city to the oil and gas in the disputed lands, the
jury (as asserted by defendant in its argument above quoted)
had a right to consider the "facts surrounding the execution
of this agreement." Among the surrounding circumstances
which the jury may have considered significant is the fact tha~
the compromise agreement with the Southwest Exploration
Company was entered into by defendant city at a date Ze"
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than one month after plaintiffs had been notified of their
discharge and only two months and five days after adoption
by the city council of tho resolution (No. 814) by which it was
Rought to cancel plaintiffs' contract. In the light of all the
evidence, and viewing it in aspects most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we cannot hold that as a matter of Jaw it fails
to support an implied finding that all of the money paid by
the Southwest Exploration Company to the defendant was
by way of compromise of defendant city's claims for oil and
gas royalties out of the disputed lands. This was a compromise
agreement. It purports to be based on the city's claims to the
oil. We cannot sever such compromise agreement into parts
and hold that any portion of the consideration was not
grounded on the city's claim to the oil and royalties therefrom.
[10] The fact that $25,000 of the $175,000-conditionallyfixed amount was paid in one payment does not preclude the
finding that it was paid as royalty. In Work v. United States
ex rcl. Mosier (1923), 261 U.S. 352, 357 [43 S.Ot. 389, 391,
67 L.Ed.693, 696], the United StateR Supreme Court said:
"'l'he bonus which was the result of bidding for desirable and
profitable oil and gas leases secured for the members of the
Osage ~'ribe the jus~ va!ue of the use of their property whiCh
the fixmg of royaltIes m advance by the President was not
adapted to give them. It was in effect a supplement to the
royalties already determined. It was really part of the royalty
or rental in a lump sum or down payment. We do not see how
it can be classified as anything else. It was income from the
use of the mineral resources of, the. land." (Italics added.)
[11] The fact that the verdict rendered awards plaintiffs less
than they might be entitled to recover does not prejudice defendant.
. [~~] It is to be observed that the defendant is in a poor
pOSItIon to urge ~h~t the evidence does not show what portion
?f the money paId It by the Southwest Exploration Company
IS. by way of royalty and what portion is by way of compromIse of some other claim. The city made the contract with the
company. It was in the power of the city, when that contract
was made, to specify therein exactly what amount was to be
paid in compromise of the royalty claims and what amounts
if any, were to be paid for other considerations. It knew
that time t1;1at plain~iffs claimed the right to compensation ~m
the percentage baSIS fixed in their contract and that th'e

at

amounts to be paid plaintiffs depended on the royalties to be .
recovered, by compromise or otherwise, by the city. If
the defendant city, knowing. such facts, deliberately caused
. or negligently permitted the contract with the Southwest
Exploration Company to be so phrased as to confuse the.
amount to be paid it for compromise of royalty claims with
other amounts, the city, unless it is chargeable on the whole
amount received, should bear the burden of proving segregation. This would follow upon principles akin to those attendant upon willful or negligent confusion of goods. (See 11
Am.Jur., pp. 529-530, secs. 3, 4; pp.535-536, sec. 11; and
pp. 537-538, sec. 13; see, also, 5 Cal.Jur. 488.-489, sec. 4; 15
C.J.S. 961-964, secs. 4-6.)
W c conclude that the evidence is not insufficient to support
any essential implied finding, and that no prejudicial error
has been shown.
The judgmcnt is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J., dissenting.-The conclusion of my asSOciatcs that the contract sued upon in this case "is binding
upon the municipality and may not be summarily canceled by
a successor council" is rested upon decisions which, in my
opinion, are not determinative of the question. Generally
speaking, in the exercise of its business or proprietary power,
the power of a board to make a contract binding over a term
of years depends upon the subject matter, and the courts and
text writcrs recognize, as being in a special category, those
relating to personal serviccs,. particularly those ofa confidential nature. No case. has. been cited. in the majority
opinion, or by counsel,. upholding a contract· with .an attorney
for a period of time beyond the terms of office of the members
of the employing board, and the only decision in. thlS' state,
except one in which the authority of a school board to employ,
a superintendent was challenged, concerned:tb.e right afan.
eng-ineer to recover from a county upon ncontrnct .1:9 extend.
abridge. (Cope v. County of Sutter, 206 Cal. 445 [274 P.
750].)'
.
..,
In most jurisdictioI1s, the rule has been adopted that where
a contract of cmployment,by its terms extends beyond the
term of the appointing municipal b04~, and .the service~ to be
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rendered are subject to the supervision of that body, the contract is invalid. The courts of a few states follow the so-called
minority rule,. holding that, in legal contemplation, the new
board is the one that entered into the contract. Under these
decisions, unless the agreement is unr~asonable it cannot be
rescinded except for cause. (See cases collected in 70 A.L.R.
794, 802.) But the courts which follow the minority rule do
not apply it to contracts providing for the employment of an
attorney. They recogni7..e the confidential relationship of
attorney and client and hold that a municipal board should
be free to select its counsel.
There are many reaso~ of public policy why an attorney's
contract for professional services to be rendered beyond the
term of the board which selected him should not be enforced
against a succSSor body which is dissatisfied with his efforts.
Subsequently elected public offieers are directly responsible
to the people for the conduct of the municipal affairs, and in
performing their duties, it is of the utmost importance that
they should have the right to select the lawyer who is to carry
out their plans and purposes. The very reason for a change
in personnel of a city council may be the electors' dissatisfaction with the manner in which the person employed to perforl? such special services has conducted the municipal
busmess. To hold that the new council is required to retain'
that person because of the action of its predecessor in entering
into a contract with him, may seriously interfere with the
exercise of a discretion which the members of the gjverning
body should be permitted to employ in its conduct of the
city'.s affairs. . Moreover, if the attorney was engaged on a
contmgen~ basIS, th~ subsequently elected officials may decide
to allow hIm to c?ntmue representation of the city's interests,
regardless of theIr lack of confidence in him rather than risk
criticism by incurring an obligation to pay' fees for services
not completed.
It should also be kept in mind that, under· circumstances
s"?-c~ as ar~ sho~ in the present case, although the city councIII~ the ImmedIate employer, the client for whom the legal'
servIces are to be rendered is the city. The members of the
council are. in. a sense, trustees of the public welfare,and they
may well. mSIst upon the benefit of advice from counsel in
whose capacity and judgment they have the fullest confidence.
The assertion of public rights which are not entirely clear'
usually requires the expenditure of large sums of money as
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well as the determination of particular policies,and the deci.;
sion as to action in a particular way should not be affected by
either friction or distrust in the relations of attorney and
client.
.
Recognizing these principles as controlling, although the
Supreme Court of Indiana, following the minority rule, has
held that contracts extending beyond the terms of office of the
members of a governing body are valid if made in good faith,
it places in a different category one providing for the, employment of an attorney beyond the time when a change'willocc1l1'.
in the membership of the employing board (Board ofOommri~
v. Shields, 130 Ind. 6 [29 N.E. 385]). Such a contract, said
the court, is contrary to public policy and void, ·;becaliSe it
"deprives the board, as reorganized from year to year; of the
right to employ its attorney for the next foll6wing year. 'If
such contracts are binding, then, no [m:atter J . ; . how distasteful an attorney may be to the members of the board,' or
how little confidence they may have in his ability, legal
learning, or honesty, so long as he performs the conditions of
the contract on his part they are bound' to recognize hini,
accept his services, and assume· the responsibility; and if· the
contract in question, extending, as it does, over ,1, period of
three years, is valid, why may not a like contract, covering a
period of six, nine, or a dozen years be upheld?" (Jay Oounty
v. Taylor, 123 Ind. 148 [23 N.E. 752, 7 L.R.A. 160]~)
More recently, the Appellate Court of Indiana held that "a
board, in order to dispense with the services of an attorney,
employed while organized in part at least with a different
membership, . and thereby be free to select one of its own
choosing, [should not] be compelled to prefer charges against
an attorney so employed, or allege and prove dishonesty or a
lack of ability on his part, or that he was distaste~ to ~ts
members, or that they had no confidence in him, as appellee's
contention would imply." (Jessup v. Hinchman, 77 Ind.App.
460 [133 N.E. 853].) And the Supreme Court of Alabama
declared that a contract with an attorney to act as counsel
for a .board of revenue beyond the term of the board as it
existed when the services were authorized was contrary to
public policy. In effect, said the court, such a contract ties
the hands of the succeeding board which "should at all times
be free to select its own confidential legal adviser. Such has
been the ruling in New York, Ohio, New Jersey, Indiana,
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Illinois, Kansas, Iowa, and Colorado." (Willett & Willett v.
Calhoun County, 217 Ala. 687 [117 So. 311]. And see Ferkin
v~ Board of Education, 300 N.Y.S. 885; Light v. Lebanon
County, 292 Pa.494 [141 A. 291] ; McCormick v. Hanover
Township, 246 Pa. 169 [92 A. 195]; Wilmington v. B7'yan,
141 N.C. 666 [54 S.E. 543] ; and annotation, 70 A.L.R. 794,
799-802.)
Considering the California decisions, although King City
Union H. S. Dist. v. Waibel, 2 Cal.App.2d 65 [37 P.2d 861],
approves the minority rule, the true basis for its holding is
the universally recognized authority of a school board to contract with a superintendent or teacher for a period extending
beyo~d the terms of the members of the board. Also, a contrary conclusion would nullify sections 2.90 and 2.92 of the
School Code, which authorize a school
district to employ a
.
district superintendent for a perIOd of four years., But III
New York, it was recently held that a contract made in July,
1933, by a school board, purporting to employ an
at
. attorney
.
law for a period of two years, was an attempt to Impmge upon
the functions of members of that body elected in 1934 and was
void. (Ferkin v. Board of Education, supra.)
McBean v. City of Fresno, 112 Cal. 159 [44 P. 358, 53
Am.St.Rep. 191, 31 L.R.A. 794], upheld -a contract for the
maintenance of a sewer farm. In Higgins v. San Diego Water
Co., 118 Cal. 524 [45 P. 824, 50 P. 670], the court considered
the validity of a contract leasing a water plant for a term of
20 years. A contract to supply water for 10 years was before
the court in Marin Water etc. Co. v. Town of Sausalito, 168
CaL 587 [143 P. 767]. Williams v. City of Stockton, 195 Cal.
743 [235 P. 986], concerned a contract for building a city
hall. A later-elected city council repected the contractor's bid
which had been accepted by its predecessor. This court held
that the city was bound by its original action. In Skidmore
v. County of Alameda, 13 Ca1.2d 534 [90 P.2d 577], the question for decision was whether the plaintiffs' claim was an
account or the statement of several causes of action, some of
which were barred by lapse of time. And the contract ordered
executed in San Francisco v. Boyd, 17 Ca1.2d 606 [110 P.2d
1036], was one providing for a survey of traffic conditions to
be completed in five years by the contractor and a staff of his
own selection; the question now before the court was not
presented or considered.
Nor does Pacific Finance Corp. v. City of Lynwood, 114

.
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Cal.App. 509 [300 P. 50, 1 P.2d 520], have any bearing upon
the present problem, for the recovery upheld in that case was
upon a contract to prepare plans and other writings required
to carry through a street improvement project, compensation
to be paid on, the basis of a stated percentage of the construction cost. Skidmore v. Dambacher, 6 Cal.App.2d 83 [43
P.2d 1110], held valid a contract to secure certain information
during an unspecified period of time. The court decided that
the services had been performed within a r6asonable period.
It requires no departure from the principles stated and
applied in any of these cases to classify the contract now
before the court as a valid one, but subject to an implied in
law agreement that it may be terminated by the 'successor
body with the obligation to pay qnly the reasonable value of
the services rendered to the date of cancellation. Very evidently, the jury's verdict for $2,000 was rendered iD. the belief
that the sum awarded, plus the retainer paid by the city, is
a reasonable amount of compensation for. the services which
the respondents performed. For, the verdict was not responsive to any issue laid down by the pleadings, nor can it be,
justified under the theory of the conclusion reached by a
majority of the court. As the city asserts, obviously if the
contract is valid and not subject to cancellation, the respondents are entitled to $2,794, not $2,000. Under these circumstances, the applicable rule is stated in Gundry v.Atchison
T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 104 Cal.App. 753 [286 P. 718], as follows:
"While the defendant cannot ordinarily complain that the
verdict is for an amount less than it might have been, if there
is any evidence at all to sustain the verdict, a verdict may not
be sustained which attempts' generally to somewhat equalize
financial conditions." The Gundry and other cases which
reach the same conclusion are controlling, this court has said,
ll,nd require a reversal if the jury renders a verdict for an
amount different from the only sum which the plaintiff could
recover under the issues framed by the pleadings. (American
States Pub. Service Co. v. Rath, 2 Ca1.2d 670 [42 P.2d 1010].)
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the ,judgment
should be reversed.
GIBSON, C. J., and TRAYNOR, J.-We dissent. While we
agree with the conclusions reached in that portion of the
majority opinion which holds that plaintiffs were wrongfully
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discharged from their employment, we cannot concur in the
view that plaintiffs are entitled to recover the compensation
specified in the contract of employment. When an attorney
employed under a contingent fee contract is discharged without cause, he should be entitled to recover the reasonable value
of the services performed by him prior to his discharge. (See
concurring opinion in Salopek v. Schoemann, 20 Ca1.2d 150,
156 [124 P.2d 21J ; Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223 [21 A.2d
396, 136 A.L.R. 226] ; Hubbard v. Goffinett, 253 Ky. 779 [70
S.W.2d 671] ; Pye v. Diebold, 204 Minn. 319 [283 N.W. 487] ;
Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170 [14 N.E. 46, L.R.A. 1917F
402] ; Ca'l)ers v. Old Nat. Bank & Union Trust Co., i66 Wash.
449 [7 P.2d 23] ; see also cases in 136 A.t.R. 254.) He should
not be permitted to recover the fee fixed in the contract,
however, for the reasons stated in the concurring opinion in
Salopek v. Schoemann, supra. The present case was tried and
submitted to the jury upon the theory that the proper measure
of damages for breach of an employment contract of this nature
is thc compensation fixed by the terms of the contract. In our
opinion, there should be a retrial oIthe issue of damages for that
reason. While it is true that the verdict does not award plaintiffs a sum commensurate with that provided for in the contract,
it is impossible to determine how the jury arrived at its verdict
in view of the theory upon which the case was tried.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied September 1, 1943. Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J.,
voted for a rehearing.
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[1] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Acts Personal to Employee-Acts Off Employer's Premises.-Acts of an
[1] See 27 Cal.Jur. 359.
McX. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 86; [2]
Workmen's Compensation, § 99; [3] Workmen's Compensation,
§ 72; [4, 5, 7] Workmen's Compensation, § 219; [6J Workmen's
Compensation, § 212.
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employee for his personal convenience, comfort or welfare do
not necessarily take him out of the course of his employment,
even though done away from the employer's premises.
[2] Id.-Compensable Injuries-GOing to and Coming from Work
-Acts for Mutual Benefit of Employer and Employee.-A
fatal injury sustained by a drilling superintendent while on
his way home to inform his wife that he would work at the
oil well throughout the night oecurred in and arose out of tho
course of the employment, where the superintendent had no
regular hours and exercised considerable discretion in the per..:
formance of his duties, where he transacted some of his employer's business from his home and used his telephone there
for that purpose, where on this occasion his employer, although
suggesting that he telephone his wife from the ofilce, did .not
forbid him to return homo, and where several witnesses stated
that he was going home to telephone with regard to the delivery of a cutting tool which was required before work .could
proeeed.
.
. .
[3] Id.-Compensable Injuries-Arising Out ·of EmpIOJDlent.-In

View of the policy of liberal construction. pf .tlie,\\·orkmen's
compensation laws, any reasonable doubt as to whether an employee's act is contemplated by the employment should be resolvod in his favor.
.
Id.
Proceedings-Rehearing-Second
Rehearing;-Qenerally,
[4]
if a party does not prevail on the original hearing before the
Industrial Accident Commission and his petition for a rehearing is denied, he may not again petition for a rehearing. He
must seek relief in the courts. (See Lab. Code, § 5950.)
[5] Id.-Proceedings - Rehearing - Second ReheUing.-If one
party prevails on the original hearing before tlie Industrial
Accident Commission and on rehearing the other party prevails, the first party may petition for rehearing of tho order
made on rehearing because he has for the first .time become the
aggrieved party under Lab. Code, § 5900, although it may 1M!
that such petition is not a condition precedent to coUrt review.
Id.-Proceedings-Rehearing-Orders
Affected:-An applioa,..·
[6]
tion for rehearing may be made from an .order denying relief
under Lab. Code, § 5803, because it is a final order of the Industrial Accident Commission in which the petitioner is aggrieved.
Id._Proceedings-Rehearing-Second
Rehearing-Newly Dis[7]
covered Evidence.-The Industrial Accident Commission may
entertain a petition for rehearing after making an order re-

